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The Green Party has championed honest politics in 
New Zealand for many years. The party has always been 
committed to open and transparent government, and 
has taken steps in the past to advance this, including by 
proactively	disclosing	our	MPs’	expenses	and	by	fighting	for	
electoral finance laws to be cleaned up. Greater transparency 
about lobbying is another step towards this goal of honest 
politics and more open government.
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The public deserves an open and 
accountable political system. Accessing 
and	 influencing	 MPs	 should	 be	 a	 level	
playing field; it should be equally easy for 
all citizens to engage as active participants 
in our democracy. Greater transparency 
about political lobbying would give New 
Zealanders peace of mind that ministers 
and lobbyists aren’t trading favours 
behind closed doors. It would also shed 
light on this sort of activity when it does 
occur, and hopefully reduce the political 
point scoring that inevitably happens 
when there are questions left unanswered 
about who is influencing whom.
The Lobbying Disclosure Bill
Former	Green	MP	Sue	Kedgley	launched	
the Lobbying Disclosure Bill in 2011 out 
of a concern about the growing influence 
of lobbying in New Zealand. After 12 years 
in Parliament she believed lobbying was 
becoming increasingly entrenched in our 
political system, and she was concerned 
that it was often happening behind 
closed doors. While New Zealand hasn’t 
experienced the high-profile scandals 
involving lobbying that are common in 
places like the United States and the UK, 
the reality remains that some people have 
a better chance of being heard than others 
– and a lot of the time we don’t know who 
these people are or the extent of their 
access. 
The Lobbying Disclosure Bill was a 
chance to create best practice in New 
Zealand while we still can. The bill 
was closely modelled on the successful 
Canadian regime, and was developed 
following an OECD report recommending 
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that member countries take action to 
establish lobbying disclosure regimes. As 
the Green Party’s new open government 
spokesperson, I inherited the bill from 
Sue when I entered Parliament in 2011. 
It was pulled from the ballot in April 
2012, and had its first reading in July. It 
passed the first reading and was sent to 
the government administration select 
committee for consideration.
Purpose of the bill
The aim of the bill was to bring a greater 
measure of transparency and public 
disclosure to lobbying activity in New 
Zealand and to enhance trust in the 
integrity of political decision-making. In 
seeking to achieve that, the bill would do 
two things: 
1. establish a Register of Lobbyists: 
anyone paid to undertake lobbying 
activity would be required to register 
and file quarterly returns with the 
auditor-general; 
2. empower the auditor-general to 
develop a code of ethics for lobbyists 
in consultation with key stakeholders 
and the public; once finalised, anyone 
registered as a lobbyist would be 
required to comply with the code of 
ethics. 
The bill defined a ‘lobbyist’ as 
anyone who is paid to influence public 
decision-making. This meant it would 
have applied to anyone who is paid to 
communicate with a public office holder 
(an	MP,	minister,	or	anyone	employed	in	
their office) in an attempt to influence 
that public office holder. 
‘Lobbying’ was defined as 
communication in an attempt to influence 
public decision-making in relation to 
legislation, regulation, government 
policy, or the awarding of contributions, 
contracts, grants or funding by or on 
behalf of the government. It did not 
include any submission to the House, 
any communication which is restricted 
to a request for information, or public 
communication (e.g. tweets, blog posts, 
Facebook, letters to the editor, etc.).
Guiding principles
From the start there were four key 
principles which guided my work on the 
bill, and which are important in framing 
the conversation about this bill. These are 
also drawn from the Canadian regime. 
Lobbying is a legitimate activity
In seeking to introduce a disclosure regime 
and a code of ethics, the intention was not 
to denigrate lobbying as illegitimate or to 
prevent	 it	 from	happening.	MPs	need	 to	
hear from those with expert knowledge 
on certain issues to help inform decision-
making. Lobbying is a valid part of this 
information-sharing process. Although 
the bill required certain communications 
to be registered and declared, it did not 
seek to prevent these communications 
from taking place.
Open and accessible government and 
Parliament are vital
We are lucky in New Zealand to have a 
relatively open and accessible Parliament, 
and	approachable	MPs.	It	should	be	as	easy	
as possible for people to actively engage as 
citizens in our democracy. In no way was it 
the intention of this bill to restrict public 
access	 to	MPs	or	to	have	a	chilling	effect	
on interactions between the public and 
their representatives. In fact, a properly 
functioning lobbying disclosure regime 
should enhance public engagement and 
participation in the democratic process.
The public has a right to know who is 
lobbying MPs on which issues
Nevertheless, part of an open and 
accessible political system is transparency 
about who has that access. The public has 
a	 right	 to	 know	who	 is	 influencing	MPs	
on which issues. Transparency about 
lobbying activity would help to level the 
playing field in terms of influence on 
decision-making. 
A lobbying disclosure regime needs to be 
practical, workable and fair
Any requirements need to work in the 
context of the New Zealand political 
system and be workable in practice. It 
is largely on this point that the bill got 
caught up during the select committee’s 
consideration.
consultation and select committee process
After the bill was first pulled, I engaged 
widely with stakeholders in an effort to 
understand how this sort of regime would 
fit within their activities and the impact it 
would have on their work. This included 
meetings with consultant lobbyists, in-
house lobbyists from businesses and 
NGOs, and representatives from trade 
unions, charities and other political 
parties, all advocating for a wide range of 
issues. 
The select committee received 104 
submissions, from an equally diverse 
range of submitters. The overall message 
was general support for the principles 
of the bill: to bring transparency to 
political lobbying in New Zealand. But 
what also became clear through the 
consultation process, and again through 
the submissions to the select committee, 
was that the bill needed amendment to 
ensure that it was appropriate to New 
Zealand’s political context. There was 
a tension that needed to be addressed 
between a disclosure regime that 
upheld the principles of openness and 
transparency and one that was at the 
same time practical and workable. 
Main areas of concern
There were at least four main areas of 
concern.
Definitions of lobbying activity and who is 
captured as a lobbyist 
The definitions in the bill as it was 
introduced were deliberately wide because 
as soon as restrictions are introduced on 
what lobbying activity is, and therefore 
who is a lobbyist, you risk not capturing 
all the activity that should be captured. It 
also opens up avenues for getting around 
the disclosure regime. However, with such 
wide definitions there was also concern 
that you could unintentionally include 
many whom it was not intended the bill 
should capture.  
Compliance: the onus of registering and 
filing returns
Concern was also raised about the 
compliance requirements of registering 
and filing the quarterly returns. 
Smaller organisations, in particular, 
were concerned about the potential 
administrative burden. 
The size of penalties for non-compliance
The bill created two offences: one for 
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those who hinder an investigation or 
mislead the auditor-general, and another 
for those engaging in lobbying activity 
when not registered as a lobbyist. Both 
of these offences came with a maximum 
fine of $10,000 for individuals and 
$20,000 for companies or organisations. 
There was concern from many that these 
penalties were too high, particularly for 
smaller organisations, individuals, and 
those representing NGOs, not-for-profit 
organisations or charities. 
The role of the auditor-general
In the bill as introduced the auditor-
general was tasked with administering 
the lobbying disclosure regime and 
developing the lobbyists’ code of conduct. 
Questions were raised about whether the 
Office of the Auditor-General was the 
most appropriate office to undertake this 
role, particularly because the auditor-
general currently has no role in relation 
to private-sector entities and focuses on 
the expenditure of public money by the 
executive. 
Revised proposal – options paper
After hearing from submitters, I drew up 
an alternative proposal that I felt addressed 
the concerns that were raised. I was able to 
present a series of recommendations that 
I hoped would form a lobbying disclosure 
regime that was more appropriate for our 
political context. These recommendations, 
briefly summarised, were: 
•	 narrowing	the	definition	of	
lobbying activity to only cover 
pre-arranged oral communication, 
where the primary purpose of that 
communication is an attempt to 
influence a public office holder in 
respect of legislation, regulation, 
government policy, or the awarding 
of grants, funding, contributions 
or contracts by or on behalf of 
government;
•	 narrowing	the	definition	of	a	lobbyist	
to someone who undertakes lobbying 
activity as a part of their regular 
duties, whether or not they receive 
payment;
•	 narrowing	the	definition	of	a	
public officeholder to only include 
ministers, meaning that lobbying 
activity is only pre-arranged oral 
communication with a minister in 
an attempt to influence legislation, 
policy, etc.; 
•	 that	the	lobbying	regime	would	be	
administered by a new, independent 
body, as is the case in Canada;
•	 shifting	the	onus	of	registering	
and disclosing lobbying activity 
from the individual lobbyist to the 
organisation they represent.
Unfortunately the committee decided 
not to accept these suggested changes, or 
pursue a register of lobbyists. While it was 
disappointing that the committee decided 
that the bill should not pass, however, it 
was encouraging that committee members 
were open to pursuing other mechanisms 
to help boost transparency in this area. 
Recommendations from the select committee
In August 2013 the government 
administration select committee reported 
back on the Lobbying Disclosure Bill. 
In the final report it recommended a 
number of non-legislative options to 
introduce greater transparency around 
political lobbying and decision-making. 
These were: 
•	 that	the	House:	
–	 develop	guidelines	for	MPs	about	
handling communications relating 
to parliamentary business;
– review the relevant Standing 
Orders to ensure consistency;
•	 that	the	government:
– require the regulatory impact 
statements and explanatory notes 
of parliamentary bills to include 
details of the non-departmental 
organisations consulted during 
the development of related policy 
and legislation;
– encourage the proactive release of 
policy papers to make the policy-
making process more transparent.
These recommendations were adopted 
unanimously by the select committee 
with cross-party support, so I am hopeful 
that they will eventually be implemented 
by Parliament and the government. 
Ministerial disclosure regime 
In recent months there have been 
several examples of why we need greater 
transparency in relation to lobbying, 
from Judith Collins’ trip to China and 
the infamous dinner with Oravida, to 
Maurice	 Williamson’s	 resignation	 and	
the recent revelations about the National 
Party ‘Cabinet Club’. In response to these 
revelations, and as a follow-up to the 
Lobbying Disclosure Bill, the Green Party 
has proposed that New Zealand adopt 
a ministerial disclosure regime, based 
on the system in the UK, which requires 
ministers to publicly release records of 
their meetings with external organisations, 
overseas travel, gifts given and received, 
and hospitality received. The records 
would be released on a quarterly basis 
and published online. The regime could 
be implemented by amending the Cabinet 
Manual.	
I believe this could be a way to meet 
the strong public appetite for greater 
transparency and openness about who 
has access to our politicians in a simpler 
way than the more extensive lobbying 
disclosure regime. A ministerial disclosure 
regime would mean that the public 
would be able to see, on a regular basis, 
with whom ministers are meeting, from 
whom they’re receiving hospitality and 
gifts, and details of their overseas travel. 
Some of this information is already made 
public through the Register of Pecuniary 
Interests, or can be sought via the Official 
Information Act. However, a ministerial 
disclosure regime would provide 
regular, proactive disclosure of this 
information, bringing a greater measure 
of transparency to decision-making and 
improving ministerial accountability.
This proposal has not found favour 
with the government, but I am hopeful 
that by keeping the conversation alive 
we will eventually take steps to introduce 
greater transparency about political 
lobbying in New Zealand. I hope my 
bill has advanced this conversation and 
increased the prospects for reform.
This article is based on the author’s 
contribution to a roundtable on lobbying 
hosted by the Institute for Governance 
and Policy Studies in Wellington on 
16	May	2014.
